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For at least sixty years, economists have been con-
cerned with how people forecast economic events. 
Many economists believe that people make the best 
economic forecasts they can, given the information 
available to them at the time. This assumption, called 
the rational expectations hypothesis; is of more than 
academic interest because it may imply that some 
government policies have little effect on people's be-
havior and therefore on the economy. 
In this paper, we test whether price forecasts are 
rational. We do so because many of the controversial 
claims of rational expectations models depend on the 
rationality of those forecasts. For example, Sargent and 
Wallace's (1976) conclusion that predictable monetary 
policies would have no effect on output or employment 
is based partially on the assumption that people ratio-
nally forecast the price level. 
Since the rationality of price forecasts is such an 
important issue in economics, our study is certainly not 
the first to test whether survey price forecasts are 
rational. In general, previous studies have found that 
price forecasts are not rational. (See Lovell 1986 for a 
review of the literature.) However, we believe that those 
studies used either inappropriate data or incorrect 
statistical methods. Most of the studies compared fore-
casters' price predictions with revised data on actual 
prices. And the ones that looked at data on individual 
forecasters assumed that the errors made by any one 
forecaster were not related to the errors made by any 
other forecaster. 
Our data and statistical methods differ from those of 
the earlier studies: We use unrevised data on actual 
prices, and we assume that errors made by individual 
forecasters are correlated with the errors of other fore-
casters. As a result of these differences, our findings 
differ as well. We find strong evidence that price fore-
casts are indeed rational. Our study thus provides fresh 
support for the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Testing for Rationality 
Before we can test whether or not price forecasts are 
rational, we must first define what we mean by a 
rational forecast. To do this, we need to introduce some 
simple mathematical notation. 
Suppose a forecaster is trying to predict the price 
level one period from now. We call the current period 
time t and the next period time t+1. The forecaster 
makes a prediction at t about the price level at r+1. 
We call the actual price level in the next period Pt+X and 
the forecast of that price level tPft+Such a forecast is 
called a one-step-ahead forecast because it predicts 
what will happen in the very next period. 
If the forecast does not equal the actual price level in 
the next period, then it contains forecast error. That 
error, which we call e,+1, is simply the difference be-
tween the actual price and the forecast: 
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(1) et+{=Pt+l-tPft+l. 
We say a forecast is rational if its forecast error is 
unpredictable, given what the forecaster knew when 
making the forecast.
1 
Having defined what we mean by a rational forecast, 
we can conduct a relatively simple test of forecast 
rationality. Suppose, for example, that we have a group 
of one-step-ahead price forecasts made by an econo-
mist. To test for rationality, we need to see whether any 
part of the economist's forecast error is predictable. 
One way to test for predictable error is to show what 
happens if we try to predict the actual future price (Pf+i) 
using a constant, the forecaster's prediction 1), and 
any other variable, say Xt, that the forecaster knew 
when making the forecast. Expressed mathematically, 
this test takes the form of the following linear regres-
sion equation: 
(2) P,+{ = a0 + ot\ tPft+x + a2 Xt + Uf+\. 
For equation (2), we want to choose values for the 
coefficients a0, al5 and a2 to predict Pt+\ as accurately 
as possible. With given choices for those coefficients, 
Mr+1 is the residual— the part of Pt+\ that the equation 
does not explain. A commonly used criterion for 
choosing coefficients in an equation like this one is to 
choose values that minimize the sum of the squared 
residuals. We do this by using a statistical method 
called an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
Forecast rationality implies restrictions on the values 
of a0, and a2 in equation (2) because rationality 
means that forecast errors are not predictable. This can 
easily be seen by subtracting tPft+\ from both sides of 
equation (2). The result is 
(3) l - tP
ft+1 = <*o + («1-1 ),/>{+! 
+ a2 xt+ ut+x. 
Note that the left side of equation (3) is simply the 
forecast error, e,+i- But rationality implies that nothing 
the forecaster knew at time t can be used to predict the 
forecast error. Therefore, in equation (3), the values of 
<*o> ofj—1, and a2 should not be significantly different 
from zero. Otherwise, some portion of the forecast er-
ror could be predicted, and the forecast would not be 
rational. 
In testing for rationality, we have only one thing left 
to decide: what information the forecaster should have 
used in constructing a forecast—that is, what additional 
variables we could include as an Xt in equation (2) to 
improve the forecast. Certainly, in making a prediction, 
a forecaster should consider any relevant publicly 
available information. By relevant public information 
we mean any data that can be used to improve a 
forecast's accuracy. For example, if you were trying to 
rationally forecast which team will win a particular 
baseball game, you should take into account the teams' 
overall hitting and fielding strength, their recent win-
loss records, the records of their pitchers, the effects of 
injured players, and the game's location. But you only 
need to know those data that could help you make a 
better forecast. You don't need to know recent home-
game attendance or the salaries of the general manag-
ers, as long as those factors don't affect the game's 
outcome. 
But publicly available information isn't the only data 
a forecaster should consider when making predictions. 
If a forecaster knows something that is not publicly 
known but is relevant to the outcome, this private in-
formation should be used to improve the forecast. If, to 
continue our example, you see the starting pitcher for 
one team become ill at a restaurant four hours before 
the game, you know this information will certainly 
affect the forecast, even if no one else knows about the 
illness. 
So we can require forecasters to use both public and 
private information that is relevant to their forecasts. 
But there are two kinds of information about time t 
that we can't require forecasters to incorporate into 
their predictions of events in time t+1. 
First, we can't expect forecasters to consider public 
announcements about the economy at time t if they are 
released after the forecast is made. Such delayed an-
nouncements are particularly relevant for economic 
forecasts because many leading indicators are reported 
late. For example, the trade deficit for February is 
announced almost 45 days after the month has ended, in 
mid-April. So we can't assume that a forecaster knows 
the February trade deficit when predicting the March 
deficit. In fact, at the time of the forecast, the forecaster 
only knows the January trade deficit. 
The second kind of information we can't expect 
forecasters to know is other people's private informa-
tion. For example, a forecaster won't know someone 
!In a strict sense, rationality requires that the forecaster's subjective 
probability distribution be the same as the objective probability distribution of 
the forecasted variable. Thus, for a forecast to be rational, it is necessary but not 
sufficient that forecast errors be unpredictable. Note, too, that a forecast can still 
be rational even though it is incorrect. 
27 else's forecast unless it has been made public. Or, a 
forecaster can't know with certainty the Federal Re-
serve's current monetary policy, which is a closely 
guarded secret. 
So far we've set up the general framework of our 
tests of rationality by constructing a simple regression 
equation, by determining the restrictions that rational-
ity imposes on the coefficients in that equation, and by 
assuming what types of information forecasters should 
incorporate into their predictions. Now we must find 
appropriate price forecast data to analyze, decide on the 
proper statistical methods to apply, and make accurate 
assumptions about what information forecasters knew 
when they made their predictions. 
What Data Should We Use? 
At first it seems fairly easy to determine what data we 
should use to test whether or not price forecasts are 
rational. We only need two different kinds of data: 
survey data on price forecasts and data on actual price 
levels. At least three surveys of price predictions exist, 
and apparently any one of them could provide us with 
our measure of the price forecast tPft+ And the data for 
the actual price level Pt+\ could be obtained from a 
commercial database. On closer analysis, however, 
choosing the appropriate data is more complicated than 
it initially seems. 
The crucial issue in choosing a set of survey data to 
test for rational expectations is finding survey data that 
reflect the respondents' true expectations. If the fore-
casters' responses don't reflect their true expectations, 
then our tests of rationality will not be valid, so we won't 
learn much from them. 
A frequent criticism of using survey forecasts to test 
the rationality of expectations is that many surveys 
collect data from academic economists or consumers— 
people with little to lose if their predictions are wrong or 
if they report them inaccurately. 
Academic economists who are not professional fore-
casters have little incentive to make accurate forecasts. 
They get paid for their research and teaching—not their 
forecasting—so we might expect that the forecasts they 
report would not necessarily represent their true expec-
tations. An example will clarify how this disparity could 
occur. 
Suppose you're an economics professor who's busy 
writing a paper to be presented in three days. Someone 
phones you for your forecast of next quarter's interest 
rate on three-month Treasury bills. Because you're paid 
for writing papers, not making forecasts (and because 
you're very busy), you quickly tell the caller the first 
number that pops into your head—8 percent. Later in 
the day, while reading the Wall Street Journal\ you see 
that the forward rate on three-month T-bills is 9 
percent. Since bond prices rise when interest rates fall, it 
seems logical that you'd rush out and buy bonds. But 
you don't because, when you think about it, 9 percent 
seems reasonable. Thus, 8 percent is an erroneous 
measure of your true expectation because you don't act 
in the market as if it really were your expectation.
2 
The same argument applies to data from surveys of 
consumers' expectations, for consumers also have little 
to lose if their predictions are wrong (as long as they 
don't act on those predictions) or if they report them 
inaccurately. 
The best way to ensure that survey data on forecasts 
reflect the true expectations of their forecasters is to use 
only the forecasts of people with an economic incentive 
to report their expectations accurately. Professional 
forecasters have such an incentive because they sell 
their reported expectations on the market and will lose 
business if their predictions are consistently less accu-
rate than those of other professional forecasters. 
When we looked for a survey whose respondents 
were limited to professional forecasters, we found only 
one—a survey of economic forecasters conducted since 
1968 by the American Statistical Association (ASA) 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
The survey's respondents produce quarterly forecasts of 
gross national product (GNP), its major components, 
and other economic indicators for each of several 
quarters ahead. Because these professionals report to 
the survey the same forecasts they sell on the market, 
their responses provide an accurate measure of their 
expectations. Thus, their forecasts should be free of the 
type of errors that arise when respondents have no 
incentive to report their true expectations.
3 We chose to 
examine the respondents' predictions of the price level, 
as measured by a price index known as the GNP de-
flator. 
To the best of our knowledge, only studies by 
Zarnowitz (1984,1985) have previously used the ASA-
NBER survey data to test for the rationality of price 
forecasts. All other previous studies that test the 
rationality of survey price forecasts have used data 
2See Cukierman 1986 for a discussion of this problem. 
3 Interestingly, the ASA-NBER also conducts an annual survey of a much 
larger group of economists of whom three-fourths are occasional rather than 
professional forecasters. In that survey, Zarnowitz (1969, p. 15) found that 
"a number of the occasional forecasters submitted extreme and . . . rather 
unreasonable predictions." 
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from people who were not professional forecasters. 
They have used either the Livingston survey of econo-
mists' predictions about the consumer price index or the 
University of Michigan's survey of consumers' predic-
tions about inflation.
4 Since neither of these survey 
groups is composed primarily of professional forecast-
ers, we think the results of studies based on those two 
surveys are suspect. 
The second data decision we had to make was which 
data to use for the actual price series—that is, for the 
values of Pt+X. This choice proved more difficult than it 
first seemed because all price series are continually 
revised. Every previous study of price forecast rational-
ity has run tests using revised data on actual prices. 
Thus, those studies implicitly test whether the fore-
casters rationally predicted a revised price level using 
the revised price level for previous periods.
5 The fore-
casters, however, couldn't have known these data at the 
time they made their predictions. Therefore, using these 
data to test forecast rationality could lead to incorrect 
conclusions. 
We have corrected for this second problem. Instead 
of using revised data, we compare the forecasters' one-
quarter-ahead predictions of the GNP deflator with the 
actual deflator data initially released by the Commerce 
Department 45 days after the quarter's end. Our choice 
of unrevised data best reflects what the forecasters 
knew at the time they made their predictions. 
What Statistical Methods Should We Use? 
We still have to decide exactly how to test whether or 
not the price forecasts made by members of the ASA-
NBER survey are rational. To test for rationality, we 
need to compare the forecast made by each individual 
forecaster with the actual price level initially reported 
in the next period. 
We can do that by estimating the following equation: 
(4) ^r+l = «0 + <*\ tP{t+1 + «2
 Xi,t +
 ui,t+1 
where tP{t+\ is the one-period-ahead forecast of the 
price level made by forecaster i in period t and where 
Xi t is any other variable known to forecaster i at time t. 
For example, the variable Xi t could be forecaster Vs 
own price level prediction made in the previous period— 
that is, t-\P{f 
The simplest way to estimate equation (4) would be 
to use an OLS regression. That method is the one pre-
ferred by previous studies that use individual survey 
data on price forecasts. (See Figlewski and Wachtel 
1981 andZarnowitz 1984,1985.) Statistical tests based 
on OLS regressions, however, assume that errors are 
uncorrected across forecasters—an assumption that is 
unrealistic. If prices in a particular period rise faster 
than the average forecaster predicted, then the fore-
casters' prediction errors will, on average, be positive in 
that period. If prices rise slower than the average 
forecaster predicted, then the forecasters' prediction er-
rors will, on average, be negative. In either case, the 
errors are correlated; that is, for any two forecasters, i 
and j, cov(ui t+uiij>t+i) > 0. If the prediction errors are 
correlated across forecasters, then an additional ob-
servation on a forecaster does not really provide an 
additional degree of freedom. But the OLS method 
assumes that each additional observation does provide 
an additional degree of freedom. Thus, OLS incorrectly 
suggests there is less uncertainty than there actually is 
about the regression coefficients.
6 
To correct this problem, we developed a new statis-
tical method that allows for the correlation in the 
forecasters' prediction errors. We treated the data as a 
panel and used a generalized method-of-moments esti-
mator to estimate the coefficients, taking into account 
the correlation of errors among forecasters within a 
given time period. (For a technical explanation of our 
procedures and additional results, see Keane and 
Runkle 1988.) This procedure let us properly test the 
rational expectations hypothesis using the ASA-NBER 
data. 
What Did the Forecasters Know? 
Having decided what data and statistical methods to 
use, we still must determine what to assume the fore-
casters knew when they made their predictions. This 
decision is important because it helps us choose which 
economic variables to include in our tests of forecast 
rationality. 
Time series models of economic data have shown 
that the most helpful information in predicting the 
future values of most economic variables is the current 
and past values of that variable. But the timing of data 
collection in the ASA-NBER survey makes it impos-
sible for an individual forecaster to know the current 
4Previous studies using the Livingston survey include Brown and Maital 
1981, Carlson 1977, Figlewski and Wachtel 1981, Mullineaux 1978, Pearce 
1979, and Pesando 1975. Studies using the Michigan survey data include 
Gramlich 1983 and Rich 1987. 
5Zarnowitz (1985) is the only author who recognized that the use of revised 
data might affect his inference, but he believed that the effect would not be 
large. 
6Zarnowitz (1985) recognized this problem with using the OLS method on 
panel survey data. 
29 price level Pt at the time of the forecast tP{t+\- We 
compare each forecaster's prediction, reported 20 days 
after the end of each quarter, with the GNP deflator 
announcement made 45 days after the end of the 
quarter. The relative timing of these events is shown in 
the accompanying chart. The forecaster predicts 1 
knowing Pt-X but not Pt, even though Pt would be very 
helpful for predicting Therefore, we can't use Pt to 
test the rationality of the forecaster's prediction because 
it was not available when the forecast was made. But we 
certainly can use Pt-X to test forecast rationality because 
that information was released two months before the 
forecaster's prediction tP{t+ 
The chart shows other data the forecaster knew at 
the time of the prediction. For example, the forecaster's 
own past prediction of the price level, t-\P{t> was cer_ 
tainly known, so we can use that previous forecast to 
test for rationality. The forecaster also knew eitt-{, that 
forecaster's own error made in predicting Pt-\ at time 
t—2. If the forecaster learns from that mistake, the 
forecaster's past error should be uncorrelated with any 
of the forecaster's future errors. 
The chart also shows that the forecaster's own cur-
rent forecast error ei t was unknown when the forecaster 
made the new prediction. That forecast error (equal 
to Pt — t-\Pfl t) wasn't known because Pt hadn't yet 
What Each Forecaster Knew When Predicting 
Next Period's Price Level 
O
Forecast Error 
Measured  Known < • Unknown 
t-2  Previous Period /-1 Current Period t Next Period M  t+2 Time 
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been released at the time of the forecaster's predic-
tion. Since the forecaster was unaware of that error ei t, 
it will be correlated with eit+{— the forecaster's error 
in the next period.
7 So, for any individual forecaster, 
co\(uit+huit)^0. 
But past prices, price forecasts, and forecast errors 
aren't the only variables that forecasters should take 
into account in making their predictions. We should 
expect that any other relevant publicly available infor-
mation will also affect their forecasts. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, for example, changes in oil prices and the 
money supply influenced price growth. Economic fore-
casters were accused of systematically underestimating 
the effects of those variables on price behavior. If price 
forecasts are rational, then neither past values of the 
money supply nor past values of oil prices should help 
predict future prices once the forecasters' price predic-
tions have been taken into account. 
Test Results 
Our tests of rationality were made using a sample of 
1,613 forecasts made by 60 professional forecasters 
from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the third quarter of 
1986. The results of our tests are shown in the ac-
companying table. 
In the table, some of the reported regressions include 
fewer observations because data were missing for other 
variables. In each regression, the variable being fore-
casted is Pt+1. Each row of test results lists the variables 
used in a given regression. We use a statistic called the 
chi-square (x
2) test to measure whether the coefficients 
in a regression differ in any significant way from what 
they are expected to be.
8 Specifically, we use this test to 
see whether a0
 and a2 differ from zero and whether ax 
differs from one. 
Our first test examines whether the forecasters' 
average prediction error is significantly different from 
zero. If the forecasts are rational, there should be no 
important difference. In test (1), the difference between 
the coefficients' values and what we expected them to 
be would be significant at the 5 percent level only if 
the x
2-statistic were larger than 5.99. Since the value 
of that statistic is only 0.900, we cannot reject the 
rationality hypothesis. 
We conducted single-variable tests to see whether 
any variable Xt that the forecasters knew when making 
their predictions could be used to improve their fore-
casts. If an improvement showed up as a result of the 
added variable, forecast rationality would be refuted. 
For each of these tests (2)-(7), we show a x
2-statistic 
that tests the restrictions of rationality: a0
 = 0, OLx = 1, 
and a2 = 0. The estimated coefficients would be signif-
icantly different from those values at the 5 percent level 
if the x
2-statistic were to exceed 7.81. 
We concluded earlier that the forecasters should 
have known Pt-X when they made their forecasts. Test 
(2) tries to find out whether the forecasters correctly 
used that information in predicting Pt+X. The coefficient 
for Pt-{ is not significantly different from zero, and the 
value of the x
2-statistic is low enough to indicate that 
knowledge of Pt-X cannot be used to predict the price 
forecast errors. 
Test (3) tries to find whether each forecaster's one-
step-ahead prediction from the previous period, t-XP{tf  was correctly incorporated into that forecaster's current 
prediction. Neither a2 nor the x
2-statistic is significant, 
so we cannot reject rationality. 
Test (4) tries to see whether the forecasters used the 
information in their past prediction errors to improve 
their predictions—that is, whether they learned from 
past mistakes. Again, a2 is
 no
t
 significantly different 
from zero, and the x
2-statistic is not significant. Thus, 
this test also supports forecast rationality. 
So far, we have not considered whether forecasters 
correctly used information about other variables—such 
as oil prices and the money supply—in making their 
price forecasts. We include these variables in tests (5) 
and (6). Test (5) shows the results for the previous 
quarter's nominal crude oil price, P0<t-1, and test (6) 
gives the results for the previous quarter's money 
supply, Mlt-X. In each case, the coefficient for the 
additional variable is not significantly different from 
zero. The x
2-statistics are also insignificant. These test 
results suggest that professional forecasters in this 
survey couldn't improve their forecasts by making 
better use of data on oil prices or the money supply. 
Test (7) examines whether Pt could have been used 
to improve the predictions of the forecasters. The re-
gression coefficient for that variable is significantly 
different from zero and the x
2-statistic shows that we 
must reject the rationality restrictions a0
 = OLx = 1, 
and a2 = 0. But these results are not a rejection of 
7 In testing forecast rationality, one common fallacy is to assume that if 
forecast errors are correlated over time, then the forecast is not rational. That 
would be true if the forecaster knew the current forecast error when making the 
new prediction. In our data, that is not true, and a forecaster's predictions could 
be rational even if €, ,+1 is correlated with ei r However, if e, ,+1 is correlated with 
e,, then the forecast would not be rational because e,was known when the 
prediction ,P{t+x was made. We assume that the forecast errors are moving 
average of order 1 for all our reported results. 
8 We use x
2-tests rather than F-tests because the forecast errors would have 
to be normally distributed for the F-tests to be valid. The x
2-tests are asymp-
totically valid. 
31 Results of Tests for the Rationality of Price Forecasts 
Coefficient on 
Constant Forecast Other Variable x2-Statistic* Number of 
Test Using <*0 a2 [Significance Level] Regressors Observations** 
(1) Forecast Only 5.853 .997 - .900 1 ,tP{M 1,613 
(6.227) (.005) — [.638] 
Forecast Plus 
(2) Previous 
Price Level 7.243 .878 .120 4.012 1-079 
(7.646) (.068) (.066) [.260] 
(3) Previous 
Forecast 7.471 .911 .086 2.331 1>119 
(7.132) (.068) (.068) [.507] 
(4) Past 
Forecast Error 7.078 .996 -.002 .875 1, e/(M 728 
(7.692) (.004) (.111) [.832] 
(5) Previous 
Oil Price 3.092 .999 -.001 1.057 I/^m-Vi 1-613 
(7.549) (.006) (.002) [.787] 
(6) Previous 
Money Supply 4.481 1.000 -.001 1.964 1 ,tPfiMlM1t^ 1,613 
(6.011) (.004) (.001) [.580] 
(7) Current 
Price Level 8.602 .709 .291 10.760 1 ,,P{(Ml/? 1,129 
(7.272) (.097) (.098) [.013] 
(8) Variables of 
Tests (2)-(6) 21.613 .761 - 10.960 580 
(11.374) (.076) - [.140] MP{„ e/M, 
V1. M1t, 
Note: The sample includes 1,613 quarterly forecasts of the GNP deflator made by 60 professional forecasters from 1968:4 to 1986:3. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses under the coefficients. 
*The x2-statistic tests the null hypothesis that = 1 and all other coefficients equal zero. 
'*The number of observations varies because not all observations include the relevant variables. Single-variable tests for rationality are included 
because they contain more observations. 
Sources of basic data: ASA-NBER, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
rationality because the forecasters didn't know Pt when 
they made their forecasts. In fact, predictions are often 
inaccurate because forecasters don't know the current 
values of the variables they are forecasting. Thus, 
understanding when forecasters knew Pt is crucial for 
correctly testing forecast rationality. 
Although we have tested whether the forecasters 
accounted for the individual effects of each of the 
previously mentioned variables on future prices, a 
proper test of rationality must check whether all these 
variables, together, can be used to make a more 
accurate price forecast. We perform this multivariate 
test in test (8). We include the following regressors: a 
constant, ,P{t+u Pt-\, ,-iP{» ei>t-U P0,t-i, and Ml,-{. 
The hypothesis of rationality implies that the coeffi-
cient on tP{t+i should be equal to one and all the other 
coefficients should be equal to zero. The x
2-statistic 
shows that the hypothesis cannot be rejected because it 
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is smaller than the critical value of 14.07. 
In short, the test results reported in the table offer 
strong support for the hypothesis that the GNP deflator 
forecasts of these professional forecasters are rational. 
The average forecast error is not significantly different 
from zero, and data that forecasters knew at the time 
they made their forecasts cannot be used to improve 
their predictions. 
Conclusion 
The evidence in this paper suggests that the price 
predictions of professional forecasters are rational be-
cause their forecast errors are unpredictable. This result 
is surprising because previous studies have found that 
price forecasts are not rational. 
Why are our results so different? They differ because 
we use better data and statistical methods. If we either 
had used revised data or assumed that the prediction 
errors of different forecasters were uncorrected, our 
tests would have rejected rationality. (See Keane and 
Runkle 1988 for these and other results.) But we have 
shown that either of those choices would be mistaken. 
Our tests show we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
forecasters optimally use the information they have 
when they make their forecasts. Of course, we still do 
not have evidence about whether or not the expecta-
tions of other people besides professional forecasters 
are rational. Even so, the evidence in this study suggests 
we should take the rational expectations hypothesis 
seriously. 
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